1,231 research outputs found
Group assertion and group silencing
Jennifer Lackey (2018) has developed an account of the primary form of group assertion, according to which groups assert when a suitably authorized spokesperson speaks for the group. In this paper I pose a challenge for Lackey's account, arguing that her account obscures the phenomenon of group silencing. This is because, in contrast to alternative approaches that view assertions (and speech acts generally) as social acts, Lackey's account implies that speakers can successfully assert regardless of how their utterances are taken up by their audiences. What reflection on group silencing shows us, I argue, is that an adequate account of group assertion needs to find a place for audience uptake
Groups with Minds of Their Own Making
According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess âminds of their ownâ but can also âmake up their mindsâ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'. In this paper I critically examine Pettit's case for group personhood. My first step is to reconstruct his account, explaining first how he understands the two capacities he considers central to personhood â the capacity to âmake up oneâs mindâ, and the capacity to âspeak for oneselfâ â before showing how he thinks these can be manifested in groups. With Pettitâs account duly reconstructed, I then turn to criticism, arguing that Pettitâs construal of making up oneâs mind does not do proper justice to our first-personal self-understanding, nor to our characteristic interpersonal forms of engagement. This leads me, finally, to consider an alternative construal of âmaking up oneâs mindâ and âspeaking for oneselfâ that is associated with the work of Richard Moran and whichargue, could usefully be exteextended to groups
Joint Commitment and Collective Belief
According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly
committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account â as a
commitment of and by the several parties to âdoing something as a bodyâ â encourages the thought that
the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore
a different way of construing joint commitment, in order to avoid the concern. This leads me to propose a
revised Gilbertian account of collective belief, according to which two or more people collectively believe
that p if and only if they are jointly committed to p as true
The Epistemology of Collective Testimony
In this paper, I explore what gives collective testimony its epistemic credentials, through a critical discussion of three competing accounts of the epistemology of collective testimony. According to the first view, collective testimony inherits its epistemic credentials from the beliefs the testimony expressesâ
where this can be seen either as the beliefs of all or some of the groupâs members, or as the beliefs of group itself. The second view denies any necessary connection to belief, claiming instead that the epistemic credentials of collective testimony derive from the reliability or truth-conduciveness of the statement that expresses the testimony. Finally, the third view claims that the epistemic credentials of collective testimony derive from the fact that it involves undertaking a collective commitment to trustworthiness, which makes the group susceptible to rebuke and blame if its testimony is not trustworthy. I argue that this last account holds the most promise for preserving what is distinctive about testimonial knowledge while still underwriting a robust epistemology of collective testimony
Joint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal
According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account â as a commitment of and by the several parties to âdoing something as a bodyâ â encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of construing joint commitment, in order to avoid the concern. This leads me to propose a revised Gilbertian account of collective belief, according to which two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to p as true
Discursive Injustice and the Speech of Indigenous Communities
Recent feminist philosophy of language has highlighted the ways that the speech of women can be unjustly impeded, because of the way their gender affects the uptake their speech receives. In this chapter, I explore how similar processes can undermine the speech of a different sort of speaker: Indigenous communities. This involves focusing on Indigeneity rather than gender as the salient social identity, and looking at the ways that group speech, rather than only individual speech, can be unjustly impeded. To do this, I make use of the notion of âdiscursive injusticeâ that has been developed by Quill Kukla, and, with reference to three case studies, show how discursive injustice can effectively derail the speech of Indigenous communities
Staying true with the help of others: doxastic self-control through interpersonal commitment
I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated âepistemic temptationsâ. The first way is through the avowal of belief, and the second is through the establishment of collective belief. I argue that both of these forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment can function as effective tools for doxastic self-control, and, moreover, that the control they facilitate should not be dismissed as irrational from an epistemic perspective
An empirical investigation of intuitions about uptake
Since Austinâs introduction of the locutionary-illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction, it has been a matter of debate within speech act theory whether illocutionary acts like promising, warning, refusing and telling require audience âuptakeâ in order to be performed. Philosophers on different sides of this debate have tried to support their positions by appealing to hypothetical scenarios, designed to elicit intuitive judgements about the role of uptake. However, philosophersâ intuitions appeared to remain deadlocked, while laypeopleâs intuitions have not yet been probed. To begin rectifying that, we ran two experiments probing lay intuitions about the implications of uptake failure. Overall, we found that participantsâ responses were skewed towards agreement that speech acts were performed, despite the lack of uptake. There were, however, significant differences across the four different speech act types we investigated (with the highest levels of agreement found for refusing, followed by warning, then telling, and finally promising). We also obtained evidence of complex effects relating to the (high or low) stakes involved in the scenarios. While this study only represents an initial exploration of intuitions about uptake, our results form a basis for further research into their nature and significance, across a range of speech acts, scenarios, and experimental designs
Responsibility and identity and genomic sequencing : a comparison of published recommendations and patient perspectives on accepting or declining incidental findings
Background
The use of genomic sequencing techniques is increasingly being incorporated into mainstream health care. However, there is a lack of agreement on how âincidental findingsâ (IFs) should be managed and a dearth of research on patient perspectives.
Methods
Inâdepth qualitative interviews were carried out with 31 patients undergoing genomic sequencing at a regional genetics service in England. Interviews explored decisions around IFs and were comparatively analyzed with published recommendations from the literature.
Results
Thirteen participants opted to receive all IFs from their sequence, 12 accepted some and rejected others, while six participants refused all IFs. The key areas from the literature, (a) genotype/phenotype correlation, (b) seriousness of the condition, and (c) implications for biological relatives, were all significant; however, patients drew on a broader range of social and cultural information to make their decisions.
Conclusion
This study highlights the range of costs and benefits for patients of receiving IFs from a genomic sequence. While largely positive views toward the dissemination of genomic data were reported, ambivalence surrounding genetic responsibility and its associated behaviors (e.g., duty to inform relatives) was reported by both IF decliners and accepters, suggesting a need to further explore patient perspectives on this highly complex topic area
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